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Fleecing the Family Jewels 
Christina M. Sautter* 
Crown jewel lock-up options, a common deal protection device employed during the 
1980s’ mergers and acquisitions boom, are back.  During their popularity in the 1980s, these 
options took the form of agreements between a target company and a buyer, pursuant to which 
the target granted the buyer the right to purchase certain valuable assets, or crown jewels, of the 
target corporate family in the event the merger did not close.  After both state and federal courts 
questioned the validity of these lock-ups in the 1980s, lock-ups lost their luster and dealmakers 
stopped using them.  But as the saying goes, “everything old becomes new again,” and crown 
jewel lock-ups have made a return in recent transactions.  This time around, dealmakers have 
been quick to distinguish the modernized crown jewel lock-ups from their predecessors.  
Although there has been limited case law addressing the validity of these lock-ups, courts 
appear more likely to uphold the lock-up if the lock-up can be attributed to a business purpose 
other than the merger and if the lock-up could be a stand-alone agreement, separate and apart 
from the merger.  This Article argues, however, that today’s lock-ups are not significantly 
different from their predecessors.  Practitioners and courts should not lose sight of the 1980s 
jurisprudence that closely scrutinized the sale process preceding a lock-up as well as the 
deterrent effects of the lock-up on potential bidders.  Failing to consider these factors and not 
giving these factors proper weight potentially results in companies and their shareholders being 
fleeced of their corporate family jewels and their value.  At the same time, however, dealmakers 
should not be as quick to shy away from lock-ups as they have been in the past.  As the 1980s 
jurisprudence made clear, lock-ups can be used to enhance shareholder value.  In particular, this 
Article argues that dealmakers may use lock-ups after an extensive sale process to incentivize 
bidders and extract additional value for shareholders. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In 1981, Prince Charles proposed to Lady Diana Spencer with an 
oval sapphire and diamond ring.1  The announcement of the royal 
engagement made global headlines, and the nontraditional ring choice 
                                                 
 1. Untold Stories Behind Kate’s 18-Carat Sapphire, TODAY, http://www.today. 
com/id/40217151/ns/today-today_news/t/untold-stories-behind-kates--carat-sapphire/ (last 
updated Nov. 16, 2010, 12:05 PM). 
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spawned a vast demand for replicas.2  Demand for replicas of the ring, 
however, eventually withered like the royal marriage.3  Almost three 
decades later, Prince Charles and Princess Diana’s son, Prince William, 
proposed to Kate Middleton with the same sapphire ring.4  As was the 
case in 1981, within minutes of the ring’s unveiling, “jewelry stores 
around the world started getting calls . . . requesting replicas of the 
ring.”5  The now-iconic sapphire ring is not the only crown jewel from 
the 1980s that has awoken from its slumber this decade.6  The crown 
jewel lock-up, a once-popular 1980s mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
device, has reemerged in recent years and is gaining a modern-day 
following.7 
 A crown jewel lock-up8 is an agreement between a target 
company and a buyer that provides the buyer with an option to 
purchase certain vital and profitable assets, or “crown jewels,” of the 
                                                 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Kate Middleton’s Engagement Ring:  ‘Everyone Wants To Copy Her,’ 
HELLO! (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.hellomagazine.com/brides/2014010916431/kate-
middleton-engagement-ring-cost/ (stating that “[w]ith Diana, everyone loved her but there 
was always a lot of controversy surrounding her marriage and death” and further describing 
how jewelers did not carry replicas of the ring until Kate Middleton started wearing it); Peter 
Victor & Colin Brown, Diana Accepts Charles’s Divorce Terms, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 28, 
1996), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/diana-accepts-charless-divorce-terms-1321560. 
html (detailing Prince Charles and Princess Diana’s divorce). 
 4. Untold Stories Behind Kate’s 18-Carat Sapphire, supra note 1. 
 5. Id.; see also Lauren Milligan, The Kate Effect, BRITISH VOGUE (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.vogue.co.uk/news/2011/07/22/kate-middleton-fashion-style--shopping-influence 
(describing the increase in demand for diamond and sapphire rings following the royal 
engagement). 
 6. The term “crown jewel” is used broadly here, because the sapphire ring is not 
technically a Crown Jewel of the United Kingdom; the Crown Jewels are those “ceremonial 
and symbolic objects associated with the coronations of English Kings and Queens.”  The 
Crown Jewels, OFFICIAL WEBSITE BRITISH MONARCHY, http://www.royal.gov.uk/the% 
20royal%20collection%20and%20other%20collections/thecrownjewels/overview.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2016).  The Crown Jewels of the United Kingdom are kept at the Tower of 
London and “include the crowns of Sovereigns, Consorts and Princes of Wales, both past and 
present, scepters, orbs, rings, swords, spurs, bracelets and robes, all of which have a specific 
part to play in the ritual of the English coronation service.”  Id. 
 7. See Daniel E. Wolf, David B. Feirstein & Joshua M. Zachariah, Crown Jewels—
Restoring the Luster to Creative Deal Lock-Ups?, KIRKLAND M&A UPDATE 1 (Feb. 14, 
2013), http://www.kirkland.com/Files/MA_Update/021413.pdf; Ronald Barusch, Dealpolitik:  
Three Trends for 2013 in the Corporate and Deal World, WALL STREET J. DEAL J. (Dec. 27, 
2012, 3:47 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/12/27/dealpolitik-three-trends-for-2013-in-
the-corporate-and-deal-world/. 
 8. The term “crown jewel lock-up” will be referred to as a “lock-up option,” a “lock-
up,” or as an “asset lock-up” throughout this Article.  Although the term “lock-up” can be 
used in the M&A context to refer to other deal protection devices, the term “lock-up” refers 
only to crown jewel lock-ups in this Article. 
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target.9  The option to purchase is at a preset price that is generally less 
than the assets’ market value.10  Although the target and buyer enter 
into the lock-up in anticipation of, or at the same time as, a merger 
agreement, the lock-up is typically a separate, stand-alone agreement.11 
 The option typically becomes exercisable if a third party acquires 
the target or if the target otherwise withdraws from the proposed 
transaction.12  Accordingly, if the frustrated buyer exercises the option, 
the target no longer owns those highly valuable assets, or crown 
jewels.13  Thus, a third party may value the target for less, and more 
than likely, the target will no longer be a desirable acquisition 
opportunity for a third party.14  Consequently, the crown jewel lock-up 
acts as a deterrent; it is a deal protection device protecting the 
transaction between the target and the buyer.15 
 Crown jewel lock-ups became popular in the 1980s and were 
mainly used as a defensive mechanism in hostile takeovers, as a way of 
favoring one bidder over another in those transactions.16  When 
                                                 
 9. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 1; see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. 
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286 n.37 (Del. 1989) (“[Crown jewels] are valuable assets 
or lines of business owned by a target company.”). 
 10. Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model:  A Director’s Duty 
of Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1424 n.349 (1989); see also Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 
1286 n.37 (explaining that crown jewels are sold or optioned “at bargain prices”).  Although 
the option is generally priced at less than market value, the option must be fair to 
shareholders.  See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 278 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (explaining that, in reviewing a lock-up challenge, a court does not need to 
determine the “‘precise value’ of the optioned assets,” nor must a court determine “whether 
the asset option prices represented fair value,” but instead courts will examine the overall 
fairness of the option). 
 11. See Barusch, supra note 7. 
 12. Palmiter, supra note 10, at 1424 n.349. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 YALE 
L.J. 1739, 1747-48 (1994) (“Because lockups of all types guarantee the recipient bidder some 
of the target’s assets if a nonrecipient bidder wins the auction, lockups are thought to lower 
the value of the target to nonrecipient bidders, and, thus to give the recipient bidder an 
advantage in the auction.”); Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 1 (“[T]he traditional 
crown jewel lock-up can serve as a significant deterrent to competing bidders and, in some 
circumstances, a poison pill of sorts.”).  Commentators also have stated that lock-ups aid in 
protecting an executed transaction because a third party may lower its valuation if that 
valuation “was based on a value for the optioned assets that is higher than the exercise price.”  
1 LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, 
SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 4.04[6] n.102 (2005). 
 15. Palmiter, supra note 10, at 1424 n.349; see also Sean T. Wheeler, SEC Hot Topics 
Institute:  Mergers & Acquisitions Update (Sept. 26, 2013) (unpublished presentation) (on 
file with author) (describing how a crown jewel lock-up deters third-party bidders). 
 16. See Barusch, supra note 7 (describing the invention of lock-ups in the 1980s); 
James A. Wachta, Note, Down but Not Out—The Lock-Up Option Still Has Legal Punch 
When Properly Used, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1125, 1125-26 (1986) (stating that target 
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challenged, courts across the country responded with skepticism.17  
Although the courts stressed that crown jewel lock-ups were not per se 
illegal, the courts emphasized that target boards must not use lock-ups 
in a manner that hinders stockholder value.18  The courts repeatedly 
stated that if target boards used a lock-up to draw bidders into the 
bidding process and to maximize value, the courts would likely uphold 
the lock-up.19  In most of those cases in the 1980s, however, the courts 
determined that the lock-ups at issue were invalid because they had 
hindered the bidding processes.20  Because they hindered the bidding 
processes, the lock-ups had the effect of leaving money on the table 
and thus fleecing the shareholders.  Confronted with this negative case 
law, practitioners shied away from lock-ups, and, like a passing fad, 
lock-ups went out of style.21  But as the saying goes, “everything old 
becomes new again,” and just like the royal sapphire and diamond 
engagement ring, crown jewel lock-ups have reappeared in recent 
years.22 
 These “modern” crown jewel lock-ups are different, however, 
from their 1980s counterparts.  First, these modern lock-ups have thus 
                                                                                                             
companies used asset lock-ups as a way of “induc[ing] a friendly suitor or ‘white knight’ to 
acquire . . . a principal asset of the target company for the purpose of inhibiting hostile 
bidders”). 
 17. See Barusch, supra note 7 (“[T]he Delaware courts began to look skeptically at 
[crown jewel lockups].”); see also infra Part II (providing examples of courts’ reviews of 
crown jewel lock-ups). 
 18. For a detailed description of the courts’ analyses, see infra Part II.A. 
 19. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (stating that lock-ups that encourage bidders to compete in the bidding process 
may be beneficial); In re Holly Farms Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 10350, 1988 WL 143010, 
at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) (stating that lock-ups that “encourage a prospective bidder to 
submit an offer” may be upheld). 
 20. See, e.g., Hanson, 781 F.2d at 283 (holding that the lock-up precluded a bidder 
from competing with the option holder); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 
1261, 1286 (Del. 1989) (finding that the lock-up hindered the maximization of stockholder 
value); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986) 
(finding that the lock-up “had a . . . destructive effect on the auction process”); Holly Farms, 
1988 WL 143010, at *6 (finding that the lock-up precluded bidding).  But see Cottle v. Storer 
Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 576 (11th Cir. 1988) (upholding the lock-up after considering a 
five-month-long search process and the board’s decision process). 
 21. See Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that lock-ups “fell out 
of favor” after the Delaware Supreme Court’s rulings in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., and Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.); Abigail P. Bomba et al., 
Vintage Deal Tools Reemerge, FRIED FRANK M&A Q. 1 (2012), http://www.friedfrank.com/ 
siteFiles/Publications/Fried_Frank_M_A_quarterly_October1.pdf (“Asset lock-ups generally 
fell out of use after the late 1980s, when Delaware courts expressed disfavor.”). 
 22. See Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 1 (“[M]odern and modified 
versions of the traditional crown jewel lock-up[s] have been finding their way back into the 
dealmakers’ toolkit.”). 
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far arisen in the context of negotiated, rather than hostile, 
transactions.23  Moreover, practitioners have been careful to attribute 
the “modern” crown jewel lock-ups to reasons other than a potential 
acquisition.24  For example, if the lock-up can stand alone, separate and 
independent from the acquisition agreement, or satisfies an 
independent business purpose, today’s courts are more likely to uphold 
those agreements as not precluding third-party offers.25  Despite these 
differences, this Article contends that the fundamental idea of the lock-
up remains the same.  Namely, the acquirer has an option to acquire 
some of the most valuable jewels of the target’s corporate family.  In 
addition, like the lock-ups of the 1980s, the question remains as to 
whether the target’s family jewels, or crown jewels, are being fleeced. 
 Part II briefly summarizes the most significant jurisprudence 
from the 1980s on crown jewel lock-ups as well as practitioners’ and 
commentators’ responses.  This Part also briefly addresses the 
standards applicable to a board’s actions in M&A transactions as well 
as to deal protection devices.  Part III illustrates examples of “modern” 
crown jewel lock-ups.  This Part also argues that recent Delaware 
jurisprudence lays the foundation for the use of crown jewel lock-ups 
in transactions involving the purchase of financially distressed 
companies.  Part IV argues that despite initial appearances and 
attempts to differentiate them, today’s crown jewel lock-ups are the 
same as their 1980s predecessors.  Accordingly, today’s courts, like the 
courts in the 1980s, should focus on the sale process preceding the 
crown jewel lock-up.  When confronted with a challenge to a crown 
jewel lock-up, the courts should not be swayed by whether the lock-up 
satisfies an independent business purpose or could stand alone as a 
separate agreement independent of the merger.  By validating lock-ups 
for these reasons, courts would allow acquirers to fleece the crown 
jewels of targets.  At the same time, however, dealmakers should not be 
as quick to shy away from lock-ups as they have been in the past.  As 
the 1980s jurisprudence made clear, lock-ups can be used to enhance 
shareholder value.  In particular, this Article argues that dealmakers 
may use lock-ups after an extensive sale process to incentivize bidders 
and extract additional value for shareholders. 
                                                 
 23. Compare infra Part III (describing transactions and “modern” crown jewel lock-
ups), with infra Part II.A. (describing cases involving lock-ups in the 1980s). 
 24. For a description of these reasons, see infra text accompanying notes 136-142. 
 25. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2. 
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II. FORCING CROWN JEWELS OUT OF FASHION 
A. The “Fashion Police”:  The Courts’ Treatment of Crown Jewel 
Lock-Ups 
 During the heyday of crown jewel lock-ups, courts across the 
country examined their use.  The resulting jurisprudence provided a 
framework for the use of lock-ups in future transactions. 
1. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 
 One of the earliest and best-known cases examining crown jewel 
lock-ups was the Delaware Supreme Court’s landmark decision in 
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.26  In that case, 
the court struck down a lock-up option after finding that the option 
“had a . . . destructive effect on the auction process” between a white 
knight and a hostile bidder.27  The court found that the lock-up and 
other deal protection devices had been entered into precisely when the 
board’s “role [had] changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to 
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a 
sale of the company.”28  This obligation to maximize stockholder value 
has become known as a board’s “Revlon duties.”29 
 In addressing the lock-up, the court noted that the Revlon board 
had not used the lock-up as a way of enhancing the bidding process, 
either by incentivizing the existing bidders to bid more or by attracting 
new bidders.30  Instead, the board used the lock-up as a way of favoring 
one bidder willing to issue new debt to Revlon noteholders “to support 
the par value” of the notes, which were trading well below par value.31  
This, in turn, protected the Revlon board from personal liability in 
noteholder suits against the board.32  Accordingly, the Delaware 
Supreme Court found that the Revlon board had breached its fiduciary 
duties in agreeing to the lock-up because the lock-up protected the 
“noteholders[’ interests] over the shareholders’ interests,” when the 
board owed fiduciary duties solely to the shareholders.33  In its opinion, 
the court was careful to point out that lock-ups are “permitted under 
Delaware law where their adoption is untainted by director interest or 
                                                 
 26. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 27. Id. at 183. 
 28. Id. at 182. 
 29. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989). 
 30. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183. 
 31. Id. at 178-79. 
 32. Id. at 184. 
 33. Id. 
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other breaches of fiduciary duty,” but that the Revlon board had not 
satisfied that standard.34  In other words, the court determined that the 
lock-up had fleeced Revlon’s shareholders because it shut down an 
active bidding process and accordingly left money on the table. 
 To truly understand the courts’ subsequent application of Revlon 
and cases involving crown jewel lock-ups, we must consider the 
intersection of Revlon and the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in 
the landmark case Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,35 which 
announced an enhanced standard of review for a target board’s actions 
in response to a hostile takeover.36  In Unocal, the court stated that in 
the context of hostile takeovers, there is an “omnipresent specter that a 
[target] board may be acting primarily in its own interests,” and thus a 
board must show it “had reasonable grounds for believing that a 
danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another 
person’s stock ownership.”37  Moreover, any defensive measures 
adopted by the board had to be proportional or “reasonable in relation 
to the threat posed.”38  In a subsequent case applying Unocal, the 
Delaware Supreme Court clarified that the proportionality analysis 
required a two-part inquiry:  first, the board’s defensive response must 
not be “coercive or preclusive”; second, the response must fall within a 
“range of reasonableness.”39 
 As previously noted, Revlon involved a hostile takeover, and the 
court was applying the Unocal enhanced scrutiny.  Despite this, the 
Delaware courts quickly extended Revlon duties to negotiated 
transactions involving a change of control, such that a board’s actions 
in these transactions are subject to enhanced scrutiny.40  Conversely, if 
the transaction does not result in a change of control, the board’s 
actions are subject to the business judgment rule.41  Although not free 
from controversy, in 2003, the Delaware Supreme Court extended the 
Unocal enhanced scrutiny standard to deal protection devices in 
negotiated, non-change-of-control transactions.42  Accordingly, “a 
                                                 
 34. Id. at 176. 
 35. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 36. See id. at 954-55. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 955. 
 39. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp. (In re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig.), 651 A.2d 
1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995) (quoting Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. (In re 
Paramount Commc’ns Inc. S’holders’ Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994)). 
 40. Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 519, 
549-50 (2009). 
 41. Id. at 551. 
 42. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 932-33 (Del. 2003). 
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target board’s decision to engage in an M&A transaction with an 
unaffiliated third party, the negotiation process, and the board’s actions 
during the preclosing period will be reviewed using either the 
deferential business judgment rule or the enhanced Revlon standard 
depending on the transaction structure.”43  The deal protection devices, 
no matter if they appear in a Revlon transaction or a non-Revlon 
transaction, are subject to the enhanced scrutiny standard under 
Unocal.44  Thus, crown jewel lock-ups should be subject to the 
enhanced scrutiny standard, even if they appear in a non-Revlon 
transaction. 
2. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. 
 The Delaware Supreme Court later reiterated, in Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,45 that lock-ups are not per se illegal 
and that there may be instances where lock-ups may be validly used.46  
Specifically, if the lock-up attracts bidders to the bidding process, the 
lock-up may be upheld.47  Still, the court was careful to point out that 
when the lock-up “involves ‘crown jewel’ assets[,] careful board 
scrutiny attends the decision.”48  The court will scrutinize the board’s 
efforts to “negotiate alternative bids” before granting the lock-up and 
will consider “improvement[s] in the final bid.”49  Like in Revlon, the 
court in Macmillan held that the lock-up did not help to maximize 
stockholder value and, in fact, had a “directly opposite effect.”50 
                                                 
 43. Christina M. Sautter, Rethinking Contractual Limits on Fiduciary Duties, 38 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 55, 71-72 (2010). 
 44. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 932-33 (applying Unocal review to deal protection 
devices in non-change-of-control transactions).  Deal protection devices in change-of-control 
transactions are subject to enhanced scrutiny because they appear in a transaction governed 
by enhanced scrutiny under Revlon, but the courts usually apply the Unocal enhanced 
scrutiny standard to such deal protection devices.  Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. 
Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681, 702-03 (2013) (stating that in “examining [deal 
protection devices in change of control transactions], the Chancery Court has tended to apply, 
or at least mention, the preclusion or coercion elements of Unocal review”). 
 45. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). 
 46. See id. at 1284-86. 
 47. Id. at 1286. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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3. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc. 
 A little over two months after the Delaware Supreme Court 
issued its oral decision in Revlon,51 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit barred the exercise of a lock-up under New York 
law in Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc.52  The lock-up 
had resulted from “an intense struggle for control” of SCM 
Corporation (SCM) between Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 
Incorporated (Merrill Lynch) and Hanson Trust PLC (Hanson).53  In an 
attempt to prevent Hanson from taking over SCM, SCM’s 
management entered into an agreement with Merrill Lynch to engage 
in a management-led buyout of SCM.54  Merrill Lynch predicated its 
participation on a lock-up option for SCM’s Pigments and Consumer 
Foods businesses.55  Under the lock-up, Merrill Lynch “would have the 
irrevocable right to purchase SCM’s Pigments business for 
$350,000,000, and SCM’s [Consumer Foods business] for 
$80,000,000, in the event that a third party acquired more than one 
third of SCM’s common stock.”56  After SCM’s independent directors 
unanimously approved the lock-up, Hanson made an all-cash tender 
offer “for any and all shares of SCM common stock, conditioned on 
the withdrawal or judicial invalidation of the lock-up option.”57 
 The Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s finding that the 
SCM board’s approval of the lock-up option was protected by the 
business judgment rule.58  The Second Circuit first recognized that 
“under New York law, the initial burden of proving directors’ breach of 
fiduciary duty rests with the plaintiff,” unlike under Delaware law, 
where, in a takeover context, the initial burden is on the target board to 
show that it had a reasonable ground for believing that the takeover 
threat was a danger to corporate policy.59  But, like the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Revlon, the Second Circuit noted that lock-ups are 
not per se illegal and “that some lock-up options may be beneficial to 
the shareholders, such as those that induce a bidder to compete for 
                                                 
 51. The Delaware Supreme Court issued its oral decision on November 1, 1985, 
while its written decision was issued on March 13, 1986.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 173 (Del. 1986). 
 52. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 53. Id. at 267. 
 54. Id. at 268-69. 
 55. Id. at 270. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 271-72. 
 58. Id. at 267, 283. 
 59. Id. at 273. 
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control of a corporation.”60  At the same time, the Second Circuit also 
noted that some lock-ups “may be harmful, such as those that 
effectively preclude bidders from competing with the optionee 
bidder.”61  The court found that the lock-up in Hanson was one that 
precluded bidders.62 
 In determining that the lock-up precluded bidders, the Second 
Circuit took particular issue with the pricing of the lock-up.63  
Specifically, the court criticized the board for failing to question the 
valuation methods used to price the optioned businesses.64  Although 
the court recognized that the courts need not determine “‘the precise 
value’ of the optioned assets” nor “whether the asset option prices 
represented fair value,” it stated that SCM had to “justify[] the fairness 
of the lock-up.”65  The court found that in agreeing to the lock-up, the 
SCM directors “failed to meet their duty of inquiry and had an 
inadequate basis for concluding one way or the other that the prices 
were ‘within the range of fair value.’”66 
 In addition to valuation, the Second Circuit considered SCM’s 
claim that the objective of the option was maximizing shareholder 
value.67  The court found that the option foreclosed, rather than 
facilitated, bidding and that “a competing bidder [was] deterred from 
making a tender offer, unless conditioned on the withdrawal or 
invalidation of the subject lock-up.”68  Moreover, the court found that 
the existence of the option forced shareholders into a dilemma.69  If 
shareholders did not tender, they would either end up in the 20% 
minority who would be forced out in the second step of the merger or, 
                                                 
 60. Id. at 274. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 283. 
 63. See id. at 278-83. 
 64. See id. at 278-79.  In his dissent, Judge Kearse disagreed with the majority’s 
holding that the directors failed to ask questions.  See id. at 290 (Kearse, J., dissenting) 
(listing questions that the directors asked during the September 10th board meeting). 
 65. Id. at 278 (majority opinion).  The court stated that in “engaging in defensive 
maneuvers, such as a lock-up option, a director’s primary obligation is to ensure the overall 
fairness, including a fair option price, to the shareholders.”  Id. 
 66. Id. at 279.  In considering whether the optioned price fell within a range of fair 
value, the court considered various financial institutions’ valuations of the Pigments division 
alone, including SCM’s own investment bank’s valuation.  See id.  The lowest valuation of 
these indicated “a $70 million undervaluation in the optioned price.”  Id.  This 20% 
differential was greater than the percent differential of the option struck down in Revlon.  Id. 
at 280 n.10.  Accordingly, the Second Circuit found that there was a “very serious question” 
as to whether the assets were “significantly undervalued.”  Id. at 281. 
 67. Id. at 281. 
 68. Id. at 282. 
 69. Id. 
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if the merger was not consummated, the shareholders would be “left 
facing the prospect of the transfer of effectively half the company for 
inadequate consideration.”70  Thus, like the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Revlon and Macmillan, the Second Circuit upheld the lower court’s 
enjoinment of the lock-up in Hanson.71 
4. Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc. 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit took 
a slightly different approach to lock-ups than the Delaware Supreme 
Court in Revlon and Macmillan and the Second Circuit in Hanson.72  
In its 1988 decision, Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc.,73 the 
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the Delaware Supreme Court’s and 
Second Circuit’s treatment of lock-ups, but also noted that “[a]ll 
auctions must end sometime, and [the] lock-ups by definition must 
discourage other bidders.”74  Hence the Eleventh Circuit stated that the 
relevant inquiry was whether the target “conducted a fair auction, and 
whether [the party granted the option] made the best offer,” not 
whether the lock-up “effectively ended the bidding process.”75 
 In applying this inquiry to the lock-up in Cottle, the court first 
noted that, unlike Revlon and Hanson, Cottle was “not a classic hostile 
takeover case.”76  The takeover in Cottle involved Storer 
Communications, Incorporated (Storer).  In early 1985, an insurgent 
shareholder group announced it would solicit proxies for nominees to 
the company’s board who would implement a liquidation and 
distribution of Storer’s assets.77  The Storer board determined that this 
liquidation was not in the best interests of the company’s 
shareholders.78  Thus, in March and April 1985, Storer’s financial 
advisor “contacted twenty-two potential purchasers” and provided 
confidential information to twelve of the twenty-two.79  Two of those 
potential white knights were Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company 
                                                 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 283. 
 72. See Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 73. Cottle, 849 F.2d 570. 
 74. Id. at 575-76. 
 75. Id. at 576. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 572. 
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(KKR) and Comcast Corporation (Comcast), who ultimately ended up 
in a bidding war for Storer.80 
 After receiving several revised bids from both KKR and 
Comcast, the board determined that KKR’s bid was superior to 
Comcast’s bid.81  KKR’s bid, however, included a lock-up, pursuant to 
which KKR would have the option to purchase either Storer’s cable 
stations or its television stations.82  A Storer shareholder brought suit 
arguing, inter alia, that by granting the lock-up option, the Storer board 
“hindered Comcast’s ability to evaluate Storer’s remaining assets, and 
thus effectively ended the bidding.”83  The Eleventh Circuit stated that 
the issue was not whether the lock-up “effectively ended the bidding 
process,” but “whether Storer conducted a fair auction, and whether 
KKR made the best offer.”84  Along these lines, the court examined the 
lock-up “in the context of the entire negotiated transaction.”85  The 
court considered the five-month-long search the board conducted, the 
fact that only two bidders—KKR and Comcast—had expressed an 
interest in Storer, and the board’s negotiations with both parties.86  The 
court distinguished the lock-up from those in both Hanson and Revlon 
in that the Storer lock-up resulted in a significant improvement in the 
share price.87  Moreover, unlike in Hanson and Revlon, the fairness of 
the option price was not at issue in the case.88  Accordingly, the 
Eleventh Circuit determined that the Storer board had not abused its 
discretion in granting the lock-up.89 
5. In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litigation 
 A few months after the Eleventh Circuit issued its decision in 
Cottle, the Delaware Court of Chancery followed up on the Eleventh 
Circuit’s idea of a “fair auction” in In re Holly Farms Corp. 
Shareholders Litigation.90  The events leading up to the Holly Farms 
litigation began in Spring 1988, when the CEO of Holly Farms 
Corporation (Holly Farms) met with the CEO of ConAgra, 
                                                 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 573. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 575. 
 84. Id. at 576. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See id. (“Storer ultimately received a cash price of $91 per share, $16 more per 
share than KKR’s previous offer, and $7.50 more per share than Comcast’s.”). 
 88. See id. at 577. 
 89. See id. 
 90. No. 10350, 1988 WL 143010 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988). 
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Incorporated (ConAgra), to discuss the advantages of a possible 
combination of the two companies.91  At the end of June, however, the 
Holly Farms board terminated those discussions after determining that 
a combination of the two companies was not in the Holly Farms 
shareholders’ best interests.92  A couple of months later, in October 
1988, Tyson Foods submitted a cash and stock offer worth 
approximately $49 per share.93  Holly Farms rejected the offer, finding 
that it was “financially inadequate,” but instructed its financial advisor, 
Morgan Stanley, to “actively explore available alternatives to the 
offer.”94  As a result, Morgan Stanley entered into negotiations with 
ConAgra and contacted other potential buyers.95 
 On October 21, 1988, Tyson Foods “commenced a cash tender 
offer for all of Holly Farms’ outstanding common stock at an improved 
$52 per share price.”96  The Holly Farms board rejected the tender offer 
as “financially inadequate,” and Morgan Stanley continued its 
discussions with ConAgra while also continuing to explore other 
alternatives to the Tyson Foods offer.97  On November 11, Holly Farms 
sent a letter to Tyson Foods stating that it would be holding a board 
meeting on November 16  to consider its alternatives.98  The letter 
stated that the board had not yet reached a decision as to whether Holly 
Farms was for sale.99  On November 16 and 17, the Holly Farms board 
met to discuss its “viable alternatives.”100  The board decided that a sale 
of Holly Farms was in the best interests of its shareholders and that the 
ConAgra swap proposal was the best financial alternative.101  
ConAgra’s proposal included three key deal protection devices:  a $15 
million termination fee, an expense reimbursement provision, and “a 
lock up option on Holly Farms’ prime poultry operations.”102 
 Tyson Foods brought suit seeking a preliminary injunction of the 
deal protection devices, arguing that Holly Farms did not conduct a 
                                                 
 91. Id. at *1. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at *2. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  Those alternatives were a leveraged recapitalization valued at $56-57 per 
share; Tyson Foods’ cash tender offer, which had been increased to $54 per share; a “ratio 
stock swap proposal from ConAgra which had a non-discounted nominal value of $57.75 per 
share”; or Holly Farms could do nothing.  Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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fair auction and that Tyson Foods never had the opportunity to actively 
bid for Holly Farms.103  In reviewing the facts, the Court of Chancery 
observed that “at some point” during the board meeting on November 
16 and 17, the board decided to sell Holly Farms.104  The court noted 
that at that point, the board’s Revlon duty to maximize stockholder 
value became applicable.105  The court critiqued Holly Farms’ sale 
process, finding that no attempt was made to auction the company in a 
manner that would satisfy Revlon.106  Instead, Holly Farms “favored 
ConAgra as a business partner” and negotiated with ConAgra 
throughout November 16 and 17, while it did not negotiate with Tyson 
Foods during that same period.107  In fact, the court found that despite 
Tyson Food’s “numerous inquiries” regarding the adequacy of its 
proposal, Holly Farms did not encourage Tyson Foods to submit a 
revised proposal.108 
 In reviewing the lock-up, the court first noted that lock-ups may 
be upheld where the lock-up is being used “to encourage a prospective 
bidder to submit an offer,” but the court also recognized that lock-ups 
cannot “end an active auction [or] foreclose further bidding.”109  The 
court then found that the Holly Farms board did not use the lock-up as 
a way of drawing ConAgra into the bidding process or as a way of 
otherwise encouraging ConAgra to submit an offer.110  Instead, the 
court stated, “the lock up was nothing but a ‘show stopper’ that 
effectively precluded the opening act.”111  The court recognized further 
that the lock-up precluded Tyson Foods from bidding for Holly 
Farms.112  Accordingly, like the courts before it, the Court of Chancery 
enjoined the lock-up option in Holly Farms.113 
                                                 
 103. Id. at *3. 
 104. Id. at *4. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at *4-5. 
 107. Id. at *5. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at *6 (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 
173, 183 (Del. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id.  The court also enjoined the termination fee and the expense 
reimbursement provision.  See id. 
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B. Dealmakers’ Responses to the Changing Trends 
 With the overwhelming majority of cases criticizing crown jewel 
lock-ups, the M&A bar was left in a conundrum.114  Dealmakers could 
continue to use lock-ups in their deals but risked a court’s enjoining a 
lock-up for any number of reasons, including that it foreclosed other 
bidders, did not reflect the fair value of the assets, abruptly ended the 
sale process, did not enhance shareholder value, or coerced the 
shareholders into voting for the transaction.  With so much uncertainty, 
practitioners chose to avoid crown jewel lock-ups altogether.  
Professors John C. Coates  IV and Guhan Subramanian probably best 
summed up practitioners’ response to the negative case law by 
observing and opining: 
What is noteworthy about practitioner response to these cases, however, 
is not the direction but the magnitude. . . .  Presumably an asset lockup 
combined with otherwise immaculate manager behavior could 
withstand scrutiny, particularly if the deal were scrutinized under 
Unocal rather than Revlon.  Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that 
practitioners have chosen to avoid these more nuanced readings in favor 
of a bright-line avoidance of asset lockups.115 
 In addition to the courts’ hostility toward lock-ups, some 
commentators have surmised that boards may not want to risk losing a 
company’s crown jewels “if the entire company is not being 
acquired.”116  Moreover, target boards may not want to “completely 
lockup deals for an initial bidder, thereby precluding the possibility of 
a higher bidder emerging (particularly, but not only, where there has 
been no pre-signing market check).”117  Similarly, target boards may 
avoid lock-up options simply due to the “prevailing wisdom” that such 
options harm shareholders because “(i) the bid premium is not allowed 
to reach its full potential, and (ii) an enhanced ability to hand-select 
acquirers insulates managers from the disciplining aspects of the 
takeover market.”118  Whether due to the negative jurisprudence or the 
                                                 
 114. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 
1986); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); Revlon, 506 
A.2d 173; Holly Farms, 1988 WL 143010. 
 115. John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups:  
Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 327-28 (2000). 
 116. KLING & NUGENT, supra note 14, § 4.04[6] n.102. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Timothy R. Burch, Locking Out Rival Bidders:  The Use of Lockup Options in 
Corporate Mergers, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 103, 105 (2001). 
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practical implications of lock-ups, asset lock-ups went out of style by 
the mid-to-late 1990s.119 
 Some commentators and practitioners have even gone so far as to 
suggest that crown jewel lock-ups may be invalid altogether.  For 
example, in determining the validity of deal protection devices in a 
Revlon transaction, commentators have stated that a relevant inquiry is 
whether the deal involved a crown jewel lock-up.120  Moreover, while 
referring to the use of lock-ups in the 1980s, one prominent 
practitioner stated, “I just don't think the law now lets you do that.”121  
Until recently, practitioners have shied away from crown jewel lock-
ups, and lock-ups have been virtually nonexistent in deals.122 
III. BACK IN STYLE:  REFURBISHING CROWN JEWEL LOCK-UPS 
 The once-popular deal protection device has awoken from its 
slumber in recent years.123  The resurgence of crown jewel lock-ups 
appears to be a direct result of JPMorgan Chase’s (JPMorgan) 
acquisition of financially distressed Bear Stearns during the Great 
Recession.124  As part of the acquisition, Bear Stearns, which “was on 
the verge of filing for bankruptcy,” granted JPMorgan an option to 
purchase Bear Stearns’ Madison Avenue, Manhattan headquarters for 
                                                 
 119. Coates & Subramanian, supra note 115, at 315, 327 (“[A]sset lockups were rare 
by the late 1980s and extinct by the late 1990s.”); Wheeler, supra note 15, at 23 (“Fiduciary 
risks associated with these lockups caused them to fall out of favor by the 1990s.”); Eleonora 
Gerasimchuk, Stretching the Limits of Deal Protection Devices:  From Omnicare to 
Wachovia, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 685, 690 (2010) (“Asset options have been 
virtually non-existent since Revlon and Mills Acquisition v. Macmillan.”).  What is perhaps 
even more interesting is that Professors Coates and Subramanian’s research suggested that 
practitioners did not use crown jewel lock-ups as much as the literature suggested.  See 
Coates & Subramanian, supra note 115, at 327 n.51.  But see Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, 
supra note 7, at 1 (referring to lock-ups as a “staple of high-stakes dealmaking technology in 
the 1980s M&A boom”). 
 120. See 1 ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE 
§ 14.05 (6th ed. 2000) (“Are ‘crown jewel’ assets involved so that other bidders would be 
dissuaded from continuing the auction if the lockup were granted?”). 
 121. Coates & Subramanian, supra note 115, at 327 n.54 (quoting an interview with 
Robert E. Spatt) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Professors Coates and Subramanian also 
stated that practitioners responded to the negative case law as if the courts had stated that 
lock-ups were per se illegal.  See id. at 327. 
 122. See id. at 327-28. 
 123. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2 (“After a long period of dormancy, 
lock-ups—‘crown jewel’ or otherwise—have seen a recent creative rebirth with some 
structural twists.”). 
 124. Reynolds Holding Sticky Fingers, BUS. STANDARD, http://www.business-
standard.com/article/opinion/sticky-fingers-113022300064_1.html (last updated Feb. 22, 
2013, 9:21 PM) (“The financial crisis inspired a revival.”). 
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$1.1 billion.125  Under the terms of the merger agreement, the option 
was only exercisable if the merger agreement was terminated, and prior 
to the termination, an alternative acquisition proposal for Bear Stearns 
had been made.126  Bear Stearns shareholders challenged the 
JPMorgan-Bear Stearns merger, arguing, among other things, that the 
lock-up option for the headquarters, combined with the other deal 
protection devices, “disenfranchised the shareholders and depressed 
the ultimate purchase price” and that the lock-up option was the 
equivalent of a 36% termination fee.127 
 Applying Delaware law at trial, the Supreme Court of New York 
held that the board’s decision to merge with JPMorgan should be 
governed by the business judgment rule and that the board “acted 
expeditiously to consider the company’s limited options” and avoided 
bankruptcy.128  Accordingly, the court found that it should not question 
the board’s decision.129  The court, however, did not stop there.  It stated 
that even if an enhanced scrutiny standard were applicable, the court 
would not disturb the transaction.130  Notably, the court stated that Bear 
Stearns “contacted over a dozen other potential corporate parties 
without obtaining a viable alternative bid”131 and observed that the 
“board was apparently concerned with preserving Bear Stearns’ 
existence by ensuring a merger with the only bidder possessing the 
credibility and financial strength to help facilitate a government-
assisted rescue.”132  With respect to the deal protection devices, the 
court stated that a heightened standard of review was inapplicable and 
that the “financial catastrophe confronting Bear Stearns, and the 
economy generally, justified the inclusion of the” deal protection 
devices.133  Regarding the lock-up option specifically, the court 
considered the head of Bear Stearns’ real estate group’s conclusion that 
the “$1.1 billion [lock-up value] represented the building’s fair 
                                                 
 125. JPMorgan Chase & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K), exhibit 2.1, art. 6.11 (Mar. 
20, 2008) [hereinafter JPMorgan Chase Current Report]; In re Bear Stearns Litig., 870 
N.Y.S.2d 709, 728 (Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 126. JPMorgan Chase Current Report, supra note 125, § 6.11.  Applicable termination 
events triggering the option included JPMorgan’s terminating the agreement because the Bear 
Stearns board of directors changed its recommendation in favor of the merger or because the 
requisite Bear Stearns stockholder approval had not been obtained.  See id. §§ 6.10, 8.1(e), 
8.1(f). 
 127. Bear Stearns, 870 N.Y.S.2d at 730, 734. 
 128. Id. at 730-31. 
 129. See id. at 731. 
 130. See id. at 732. 
 131. Id. at 731. 
 132. Id. at 734. 
 133. Id. at 735. 
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value.”134  Thus, the court dismissed the stockholders’ complaint.135  
Some would say that this has paved the way for lock-ups in modern 
transactions. 
A. Modern Crown Jewel Lock-Ups 
 Despite the extraordinary circumstances leading up to the 
JPMorgan-Bear Stearns merger, the Bear Stearns lock-up has brought 
lock-ups back into fashion.  Practitioners, however, are conscious of 
the lessons learned from the 1980s case law.  They note that courts 
may view lock-ups “more favorably” if they involve targets, like Bear 
Stearns, who are “facing ‘merge-or-die’ financial distress.”136  At the 
same time, practitioners are quick to stress that “[w]hat might pass 
muster for targets in ‘life-or-death’ situations or in financial distress 
may not be advisable forms of deal protection in the ordinary 
course.”137  Practitioners point out, however, that if the target board “has 
a demonstrable business purpose for, or benefit from,” the lock-up, it 
may be easier to defend.138  Also, if the lock-up can “stand[] on its 
own,” separate and apart from the business combination, the 
arrangement may be more likely to withstand judicial scrutiny.139  
Likewise, if the parties can articulate a “particular need of the buyer” 
that is satisfied by the lock-up, commentators suggest that the courts 
may be more likely to uphold the lock-up.140  Possible examples of a 
buyer’s need or other justification for demanding a lock-up include 
“foregoing another acquisition opportunity or business development 
efforts” to pursue an acquisition of the target.141  Practitioners have 
incorporated these “lessons” into recent transactions.142  The following 
is a detailed description of those recent transactions including 
“modern” crown jewel lock-ups. 
                                                 
 134. Id. at 734. 
 135. See id. at 741. 
 136. Wheeler, supra note 15, at 25. 
 137. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2. 
 138. Id.; see also David Benoit, Security Detail Protects NYSE Deal, WALL STREET J. 
(Jan. 30, 2013, 6:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732392 
6104578274112350462452 (summarizing Professor Coates’ opinion that “[c]ourt rulings 
generally say an agreement that makes business sense for the seller, and its shareholders, is 
allowable”); Wheeler, supra note 15, at 25 (“Seller should have a discernible benefit from 
executing an independent agreement other than circumventing fiduciary concerns.”). 
 139. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2; see also Wheeler, supra note 15, 
at 25 (noting that a crown jewel lock-up written as an “[i]ndependent agreement [is] more 
likely to be upheld if [it is] not contingent on the consummation of the merger”). 
 140. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 2. 
 141. Wheeler, supra note 15, at 25. 
 142. See supra Part II.A. 
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1. Apple-AuthenTec:  Demonstrable Business Purpose 
 Apple Inc.’s (Apple) 2012 acquisition of AuthenTec, Inc. 
(AuthenTec), a provider of “mobile security software licenses and 
fingerprint sensor technology,” is an example of crown jewel lock-up’s 
being attributed to a demonstrable business purpose.143  But that is only 
part of the story.  The crux of this tale involves a powerful company 
(Apple) using its unique bargaining power and limited competition to 
corner a much smaller company (AuthenTec) into a deal with terms 
beneficial to Apple.  Apple’s acquisition of AuthenTec began in late 
2011 and early 2012 when AuthenTec contacted “several leading 
consumer electronics companies to gauge potential market interest” in 
its new fingerprint technology.144  Of the several parties contacted, 
Apple was the only potential customer that expressed an interest in the 
development of the technology.145  In February 2012, the officers of 
both companies met to negotiate the terms for a commercial contract 
regarding “the further development of this new technology.”146  During 
the meetings, Apple’s representatives told the AuthenTec representa-
tives that they were not satisfied with the financial terms within the 
commercial agreement, but did make a suggestion for an acquisition of 
AuthenTec.147  By May 2012, Apple had decided to propose an 
acquisition of AuthenTec for $7 per share, instead of pursing a stand-
alone commercial agreement.148  In fact, Apple made it clear that it 
would no longer negotiate a commercial agreement for the technology 
outside of an acquisition context.149  In addition, Apple stated that it 
would not participate in an auction and that it would rescind its offer if 
                                                 
 143. Christopher Versace, Securing the Future of Apple’s iPhones and iPads, FORBES 
(Jan. 22, 2013, 10:03 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2013/01/22/ 
securing-the-future-of-apples-iphones-and-ipads/. 
 144. AuthenTec, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 18 (Aug. 31, 2012) 
[hereinafter AuthenTec Proxy Statement].  Although AuthenTec’s filings do not include the 
names of the parties contacted, AuthenTec “counts Alcatel-Lucent, Cisco, Fujitsu, HBO, HP, 
Lenovo, LG, Motorola, Nokia, Orange, Samsung, Sky, and Texas Instruments among its 
customers.”  Matt Brian, Why Apple Really Bought AuthenTec:  It Wanted “New 
Technology” for Upcoming Products, and Quickly, NEXT WEB (Aug. 16, 2012, 12:52 PM), 
http://thenextweb.com/apple/2012/08/16/the-real-reason-apple-acquired-authentec-because-
needed-new-technology-quickly-products/.  In the preceding two years, “multiple parties” 
had contacted AuthenTec regarding “possible strategic transactions,” but those conversations 
never progressed beyond the preliminary stages.  AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra, at 18. 
 145. AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra note 144, at 18. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 19. 
 149. Id. 
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AuthenTec were to solicit alternative proposals.150  After meeting with 
outside financial and legal counsel, AuthenTec’s board allowed its 
representatives to pursue a transaction with Apple for $8 a share, but 
directed the representatives to seek the ability to solicit other offers 
either presigning or postsigning via a go-shop provision.151  Apple 
responded that it would not allow AuthenTec to pursue other 
alternatives presigning nor would it agree to a go-shop provision; 
however, it indicated it would allow for the customary no-shop and 
fiduciary-out provisions, which would allow AuthenTec to respond to 
any unsolicited offers.152  On May 9, 2012, the AuthenTec board 
authorized its representatives to continue negotiations on the terms 
Apple outlined, and both merger negotiations and due diligence 
proceeded from May through the end of July 2012.153 
 On July 26, 2012, when the two parties entered into an all-cash 
merger agreement, the parties simultaneously entered into an 
Intellectual Property and Technology Agreement (IP Agreement).154  
The IP Agreement functioned as a type of crown jewel lock-up, 
according to which Apple paid $20 million in exchange for 
AuthenTec’s granting Apple the right to acquire “non-exclusive, 
perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide license[s]” in AuthenTec hardware 
and software technology and sensor patents.155  This right would 
continue to exist whether or not the merger was consummated.156  To 
exercise these acquisition rights, Apple was obligated to provide 
AuthenTec with written notice of its intent to exercise within the 270 
days following the IP Agreement’s effective date of July 26, 2012.157  If 
Apple chose to exercise the hardware and patent license acquisition 
                                                 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 19-20. 
 152. Id. at 20. 
 153. See id. at 20-24.  During May 2012, Apple conducted due diligence, and on May 
30, Apple communicated its unwillingness to proceed with the acquisition due to concerns 
raised through its due diligence.  Id. at 20-21.  These issues were resolved by July 3, 2012, 
and Apple announced they would continue with the transaction in lieu of a traditional 
commercial transaction.  Id. at 22.  AuthenTec’s board agreed to the merger transaction on 
July 26, 2012, after discussion with outside financial and legal counsel.  Id. at 24. 
 154. AuthenTec, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (July 27, 2012) [hereinafter 
AuthenTec Current Report]. 
 155. Id. exhibit 10.1, at 1, 2.  An attorney representing Apple in Delaware litigation 
relating to the transaction stated that “the only technology that is being licensed under the IP 
agreement is technology relating to the 2-D project, the two-dimensional fingerprint 
verification product that Apple and AuthenTec were in the process of developing.”  
Telephonic Oral Argument Motion To Expedite Proceedings at 18-19, In re AuthenTec, Inc. 
S’holder Litig., No. 7735-VCP (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2013). 
 156. Wolf, Feirstein & Zachariah, supra note 7, at 1. 
 157. AuthenTec Current Report, supra note 154, exhibit 10.1, at 1, 12. 
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right, Apple was obligated to pay a total of $90 million to AuthenTec.158  
If Apple chose to exercise the software and patent license acquisition 
right, it was obligated to pay a total of $25 million to AuthenTec.159  
Once AuthenTec received these payments, Apple did not owe any other 
payments.  Thus, the license rights did not provide any ongoing 
income to AuthenTec.  Due to the one-time nature of the payments, the 
IP Agreement acted as a type of crown jewel lock-up because 
AuthenTec was in essence selling the technology to Apple. 
 With the IP Agreement appearing to be a type of “crown jewel 
lock-up,” the AuthenTec Board made sure to document, in its proxy 
statement, the independent business reasons for recommending that 
the stockholders vote to approve the IP Agreement.160  Specifically, the 
proxy statement stated that the AuthenTec board believed that the IP 
Agreement “would provide significant value to any third party seeking 
to make an acquisition proposal,” stating further that “the successful 
integration into Apple’s products . . . would increase demand for 
[AuthenTec’s] technologies and products from third parties.”161  Not 
everyone agreed with the AuthenTec board’s opinion that the IP 
Agreement would entice third parties to make an acquisition proposal 
for AuthenTec.  For example, in his N.Y. Times DealBook “Deal 
Professor” column, Professor Steven Davidoff Solomon explained that 
the likely impact of the IP Agreement would be to “severely 
discourage” third-party jumping bids.162  He explained that because 
“Apple is such a dominant force in the electronics world and would no 
longer need to license or buy AuthenTec’s products, it would make any 
acquisition less worthwhile.”163  As described previously, this was the 
case because Apple’s license acquisition rights were one-time 
payments and did not provide ongoing income to AuthenTec.  Hence 
even though the licenses were nonexclusive, it was as if the technology 
had been sold to Apple. 
                                                 
 158. Id. exhibit 10.1, at 5.  The $90 million payment was split up such that $72 million 
was due thirty days after the date on which Apple sent AuthenTec written notice and the other 
$18 million was due in four $4.5 million installments.  Id. 
 159. Id. exhibit 10.1, at 8.  The $25 million payment was split up such that $20 million 
was due thirty days after Apple provided written notice to AuthenTec and $5 million was due 
in four $1.25 million installments.  Id. 
 160. AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra note 144, at 25-28. 
 161. Id. at 26-27. 
 162. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Apple’s Quiet Deal for AuthenTec, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Aug. 1, 2012, 9:36 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/apples-quiet-
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 Professor Davidoff Solomon was not the only person to hold this 
view of the acquisition.  By August 30, 2012, stockholders filed 
thirteen putative class-action suits against AuthenTec, members of 
AuthenTec’s Board, and Apple, nine of which were filed in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery.164  The suits sought to enjoin 
consummation of the merger and performance of certain obligations 
under the IP Agreement and, among other things, alleged that the 
AuthenTec board had breached its fiduciary duties “by failing to 
maximize stockholder value and by failing to disclose material 
information.”165  During a hearing on a motion to expedite in Delaware, 
the defendants argued that calling the IP Agreement a crown jewel 
lock-up was a “misnomer” because it did not involve crown jewel 
assets and further that “it didn’t lock anything up and it didn’t lock 
anybody out.”166  In response, Vice Chancellor Parsons stated that the 
determination of whether the case involved a crown jewel lock-up 
turned on two issues.167  First, the importance of the patents must be 
weighed against AuthenTec’s other intellectual property, a balancing 
determination that the court was unable to make based on the existing 
record.168  Parsons noted that the patents had to be somewhat important 
simply “given the nature of the alternative agreement . . . Apple has 
entered into regarding them.”169  Second, he noted that although the 
licenses were nonexclusive, the court must determine the “impact” the 
licenses may have on third parties who may be considering a jumping 
bid.170  This was also an issue that the court could not determine based 
on the existing record.171  Parsons compared the option to a reverse 
                                                 
 164. AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra note 144, at 10.  The remaining suits were 
filed in the state of Florida.  Final resolution of those cases is unclear, but the following is 
clear:  on March 19, 2013, one of the suits filed in the Florida Eighteenth Judicial Circuit 
Court for Brevard County was dismissed, and this dismissal was affirmed by the Florida Fifth 
District Court of Appeal.  See Brown v. AuthenTec, Inc., 109 So. 3d 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2013) (unpublished table decision).  The plaintiffs in the remaining Florida cases filed a 
motion to expedite on August 2, 2012, which the defendants opposed; the defendants also 
moved to dismiss or stay the Florida cases.  See AuthenTec Defendants’ Brief in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Expedited Proceedings, In re AuthenTec, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 
7735-VCP (Del. Ch. Nov. 25, 2015).  The Florida court declined to stay the cases, and the 
plaintiffs then filed a motion for preliminary injunction on September 5, 2012.  Id.  As of 
September 17, 2012, a preliminary injunction hearing had not been set.  Id. 
 165. AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra note 144, at 46. 
 166. Telephonic Oral Argument Motion To Expedite Proceedings, supra note 155, at 
17. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See id. at 18. 
 169. Id. at 17-18. 
 170. Id. at 18. 
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termination fee, in that Apple would be paying a fee if the deal 
between Apple and AuthenTec did not close.172  Once Apple paid the 
fee, it would have the rights to the technology.173  Although Parsons did 
not pass judgment on whether the agreements amounted to a crown 
jewel lock-up, he did say that he believed the agreement would “have 
some impact on the value, the marketability, of AuthenTec, or at least 
there is a colorable claim to that effect.”174  He ultimately denied the 
motion to expedite, and by November 25, 2013, the nine Delaware 
Court of Chancery suits had been dismissed with prejudice, without 
the court’s addressing the merits or validity of the crown jewel lock-
up.175 
 Vice Chancellor Parsons’ treatment of the Apple-AuthenTec 
transaction likely has limited precedential value because he was ruling 
on a motion to expedite, and thus he did not have a complete record 
before him.  At the same time, however, Parsons’ ruling sends a mixed 
message.  As an all-cash transaction, the Apple-AuthenTec deal should 
be subject to a heightened level of scrutiny under Revlon, and any deal 
protection devices, including a crown jewel lock-up, would also be 
subject to enhanced scrutiny (no matter if that scrutiny is under Revlon 
or Unocal).  But it is unclear from Parsons’ ruling if he was applying 
enhanced scrutiny or would apply enhanced scrutiny to a full record.  
Parsons seems to have sidestepped the issue by stating that he could 
not determine on the limited record whether the agreement was in fact 
a crown jewel lock-up.  This sends a message that although the 
transaction may be an all-cash, Revlon transaction, enhanced scrutiny 
may only apply if a particular deal provision were deemed to be a deal 
protection device.  By recognizing that the patents had to be at least 
somewhat important given the fact that the parties had entered into a 
specific agreement and by stating that the agreement had to have at 
least “some impact on value,” Parsons came close to ruling that the IP 
Agreement was a crown jewel lock-up, but then punted the issue.  
Accordingly, it is unclear whether enhanced scrutiny applies or 
whether the more deferential business judgment rule applies.  In any 
event, the Apple-AuthenTec transaction provides an example of parties 
attributing what is likely a crown jewel lock-up to a demonstrable 
                                                 
 172. See id. at 20. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 21. 
 175. See id. at 37 (denying the motion to expedite); AuthenTec Proxy Statement, supra 
note 144 (stating that three of the lawsuits filed in Delaware were voluntarily dismissed with 
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business purpose in an attempt to avoid the agreement being classified 
as a crown jewel lock-up and presumably hoping to obtain deferential 
treatment. 
2. NYSE-ICE:  Crown Jewel Lock-ups as Stand-Alone Agreements 
 Another popular argument that attempts to justify lock-ups is that 
the lock-up agreement could be a stand-alone agreement, separate and 
independent from the merger.  The merger of NYSE Euronext (NYSE) 
and IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (ICE), is an example of a 
transaction in which this argument has been used to justify a lock-up.  
Before entering into a merger agreement with ICE, NYSE had 
attempted to engage in another potential transaction that fell through, 
paving the way for a merger with ICE.  That first transaction was 
announced on February 15, 2011, and was a “merger of equals” 
between NYSE and Deutsche Börse AG.176  Following that 
announcement, on April 1, 2011, NYSE received an offer from ICE 
and NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. (NASDAQ), offering to buy all the 
outstanding shares of NYSE common stock for a mixture of cash and 
NASDAQ and ICE common stock.177  NASDAQ and ICE hoped to 
merge the “two biggest stock exchange operators in the United States” 
and create synergies in a competitive marketplace.178  On April 11, the 
NYSE board of directors rejected the offer from NASDAQ and ICE 
and reaffirmed the potential transaction with Deutsche Börse AG.179 
 On April 19, 2011, NASDAQ and ICE sent NYSE a letter with 
more details regarding their offer; however, NYSE’s board rejected the 
offer again, with concern that the NASDAQ and ICE proposal would 
not receive regulatory approval.180  On May 16, 2011, ICE and 
NASDAQ issued a press release, stating that they would not pursue an 
acquisition of NYSE due to regulatory concerns.181  On February 1, 
2012, the European Commission prohibited the transaction between 
NYSE and Deutsche Börse AG due to anticompetitive concerns, and 
the parties subsequently terminated their agreement.182  During 
                                                 
 176. IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 77 (Apr. 30, 
2013) [hereinafter IntercontinentalExchange Proxy Statement]. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Michael J. de la Merced, Nasdaq and ICE Make Hostile Bid for NYSE Euronext, 
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September 2012, the CEOs of NYSE and ICE met sporadically and 
discussed the possibility of a transaction between ICE and NYSE.183  
On September 13, ICE’s board of directors gave ICE’s CEO 
permission to explore a potential transaction with NYSE.184  That same 
day, the NYSE board met to discuss possible strategic alternatives.185  
The NYSE board evaluated a stand-alone strategy and reviewed 
potential partners for other potential transactions.186  Furthermore, the 
board considered the separation or sale of its businesses, including its 
European derivatives business or its continental European cash-trading 
and listings business.187  The board ultimately decided to pursue 
potential opportunities regarding these options.188  A mutual 
confidentiality agreement was signed on October 5, 2012, which 
ultimately led to the final merger agreement between the parties on 
December 20, 2012.189  Pursuant to the merger agreement, NYSE 
shareholders would receive approximately 67% stock and 33% cash.190 
 The same day that ICE and NYSE entered into a merger 
agreement, their subsidiaries simultaneously entered into a Clearing 
and Financial Intermediary Services Agreement (Clearing Services 
Agreement).191  Under the terms of the Clearing Services Agreement, 
ICE Clear Europe Limited (ICE Clear), a wholly owned subsidiary of 
ICE, agreed to provide London International Financial Futures and 
Options Exchange (LIFFE) Administration and Management, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of NYSE, clearing services for LIFFE’s London 
derivatives trading market.192  In exchange, LIFFE agreed to pay ICE 
Clear certain fixed clearing service costs “plus an applicable 
margin.”193  LIFFE also agreed to provide financial intermediary 
services to ICE Clear.194  The Clearing Services Agreement was a 
stand-alone agreement, which would go into effect whether or not the 
merger was consummated.195  On July 2, 2013, NYSE and ICE 
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 184. Id. at 78. 
 185. Id. 
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 189. Id. at 78, 85. 
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announced completion of the clearing transition of NYSE LIFFE’s 
London derivatives market to ICE Clear Europe.196 
 In a joint ICE-NYSE definitive proxy statement dated April 30, 
2012, the two boards of directors acknowledged the concern that 
certain provisions of the merger agreement and the Clearing Services 
Agreement might discourage third parties from submitting superior 
bids to acquire NYSE, either during the preclosing period or if the deal 
was terminated prior to closing.197  Despite this concern, both the ICE 
and NYSE boards recommended that the shareholders of each 
company approve the transactions because of the substantial cost-
saving synergies for both entities.198  For ICE, the Clearing Services 
Agreement would “see ICE make [its] mark in the European clearing 
space and lay down the gauntlet for competition.”199  For NYSE, the 
agreement would eliminate nearly $80 million in costs associated with 
NYSE’s development of its own clearing house, as well as the risk that 
NYSE would have a difficult time creating its own internal clearing 
house after the announcement of the ICE transaction.200  Even if the 
merger between ICE and NYSE was not consummated, NYSE was 
guaranteed clearing of its European futures trades.201 
 Once ICE and NYSE announced the execution of the merger 
agreement, a total of thirteen putative stockholder class action 
complaints were filed.202  All complaints included similar allegations 
concerning the NYSE board of directors’ breach of the fiduciary 
duties of both care and loyalty.203  They specifically alleged that both 
the merger agreement and the Clearing Services Agreement included 
preclusive deal protection provisions that had deterred third-party 
bidders from submitting competitive offers for NYSE.204  In the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, then-Chancellor Strine found that the 
deal protection provisions were not preclusive because there was “no 
                                                 
 196. See Press Release, IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., ICE Clear Europe Completes 
Clearing Transition of NYSE Liffe Derivatives Contracts (July 2, 2013), http://ir.theice. 
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 197. IntercontinentalExchange Proxy Statement, supra note 176, at 40. 
 198. Id. at 87, 101. 
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evidence in the record that presents a barrier to any serious acquirer.”205  
Strine found it undisputed that the Clearing Services Agreement was 
crucial to NYSE, which would have a difficult time implementing its 
own clearing services.  He specifically stated, “So that issue of the so-
called crown jewel isn’t there.”206  In reaching this conclusion, Strine 
placed a particular emphasis on the lack of other deal partners in 
existence.  Specifically, he noted that NYSE was unable to get a deal 
done with Deutsche Börse AG, and he further stated that the plaintiffs’ 
suggestion that NYSE could get a deal done with the NASDAQ was 
“sort of . . . funny to” him.207  Then-Chancellor Strine further noted that 
if another person wanted to do a deal with NYSE, it could “play Let’s 
Make a Deal with ICE and you buy them out of that contract or, 
frankly, you just make clear to them [that] they better be a great 
clearinghouse.”208  Accordingly, Strine was of the opinion that the 
Clearing Services Agreement did not amount to a crown jewel lock-
up.209 
 Like Vice Chancellor Parsons’ opinion in the Apple-AuthenTec 
case, Strine’s treatment of the agreement in this case sends a mixed 
message as to the proper standard of review regarding lock-ups.  The 
67% stock/33% cash consideration in this case likely would not trigger 
Revlon, but deal protection devices are presumably still subject to an 
enhanced level of scrutiny.210  At first glance, Strine appears to have 
been applying an enhanced-scrutiny standard by finding that the deal 
protection devices, including the crown jewel lock-up, were not 
preclusive.  But then he went on to state that the Clearing Services 
Agreement was not a crown jewel lock-up because it did not preclude 
any bidders.  There is a “chicken and the egg” problem with this 
analysis.  If the agreement was not a crown jewel lock-up, then it was 
not a deal protection device and thus not subject to enhanced scrutiny 
(i.e., the preclusiveness and coerciveness inquiry under Unocal).211  
Maybe Strine was saying that the agreement is a crown jewel lock-up, 
but that it is not a preclusive crown jewel lock-up.  In any event, the 
                                                 
 205. In re NYSE Euronext S’holders Litig., No. 8136-CS, slip op. at 1, 12 (Del. Ch. 
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opinion is unclear and likely leaves practitioners in a conundrum as to 
how to negotiate crown jewel lock-ups. 
3. Pacific Rubiales-Petrominerales:  A Modern Crown Jewel Lock-
Up with Traditional Roots 
 Of the modern crown jewel lock-ups, Pacific Rubiales Energy 
Corporation’s (Pacific Rubiales) acquisition of Petrominerales Limited 
(Pretrominerales) is the most similar to the traditional crown jewel 
lock-ups of the 1980s.  In January 2012, Petrominerales “concluded 
that prevailing market conditions” could lead to unsolicited acquisition 
offers for its operations and subsequently hired TD Securities to help it 
identify potential acquisition partners and provide advice for any 
potential transactions.212  From January to August 2012, Petrominerales 
received several unsolicited offers, including an offer from Pacific 
Rubiales, which led Petrominerales to have its financial advisor 
prepare a data room and invite a select number of parties to enter into 
confidentiality and standstill agreements.213  From September 2012 to 
February 2013, seven parties, not including Pacific Rubiales, entered 
into confidentiality agreements with Petrominerales and proceeded to 
conduct due diligence.214  One of those parties submitted an offer, but 
Petrominerales and that party were unable to come to an agreement on 
the terms of the transaction.215 
 In June 2013, Petrominerales determined that access to the data 
room and interactions with potential parties would not likely result in a 
strategic transaction, and thus Petrominerales closed its data room and 
ceased all active discussions with potential parties.216  In August 2013, 
Pacific Rubiales reached out to Petrominerales to discuss the potential 
for a transaction and submitted an offer for an all-cash transaction.217  
From August to September 2013, Petrominerales renewed discussions 
with the other parties who had previously signed confidentiality 
agreements.218  On September 16, 2013, Pacific Rubiales submitted a 
second, revised nonbinding expression of interest to Petrominerales, 
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and subsequent negotiations were held.219  The next day, 
Petrominerales’ board of directors met to review potential transactions 
with various parties, including Pacific Rubiales.220  At that meeting, the 
board directed the management to negotiate with an eye towards 
completing a transaction with Pacific Rubiales.221  On September 18, 
2013, both parties signed a letter of intent and commenced 
negotiations on the terms of the transaction.222 
 On September 29, 2013, Pacific Rubiales announced that it had 
entered into an “Arrangement Agreement” with Petrominerales for a 
cash-only acquisition of all of its current and outstanding stock.223  The 
agreement proposed a cash-for-stock acquisition, with Pacific 
Rubiales paying for each Petrominerales common share CAD$11 cash 
and one common share of a newly formed exploration and production 
company.224  The Arrangement Agreement was detailed in 
Petrominerales’ Information Circular and stated that Pacific Rubiales 
made an irrevocable offer to purchase “Midstream Assets.”225  Specific 
details of the offer are limited regarding its exact terms, which were set 
forth in a disclosure letter that is not available for public disclosure.226 
 The Midstream Assets offer had been in the works since May 
2013, when Petrominerales “commenced a formal process to pursue 
opportunities to monetize certain of its Midstream Assets.”227  The 
Midstream Assets included “Petrominerales’ transport rights in the 
OCENSA Pipeline; . . . Petrominerales’ 9.65% equity interest and 
transport rights in the OBC Pipeline”; and “Petrominerales’ 5% equity 
interest in the OCENSA Pipeline,” which is located in Colombia.228  
Due to Colombia’s “rugged terrain and lack of infrastructure,” the 
pipeline assets were particularly valuable because they are “the only 
cost effective method of transporting crude in a country that is now 
Latin America’s fourth largest oil producer.”229 
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 This crown jewel lock-up was different from the traditional lock-
up in that the target company, Petrominerales, could accept the offer 
(but did not have to) if the acquisition with Pacific Rubiales was “not 
completed by December 10, 2013 for any reason.”230  Moreover, unlike 
the traditional lock-up, which typically binds the target to sell the 
assets to the optionholder if the target enters into an agreement with 
another buyer, Petrominerales was not bound to the agreement were 
another offer to emerge for its stake in the OCENSA pipeline.231  
However, Petrominerales could not enter into another agreement 
without the consent of Pacific Rubiales.232  If no other offer presented 
itself, however, Pacific Rubiales was obligated to purchase the 
Midstream Assets if Petrominerales accepted the irrevocable offer.233  
This modified crown jewel lock-up provided cash to Petrominerales, 
which had seen its cash flow drop 45% in the preceding year due to 
lower oil prices, but it also dissuaded other buyers from bidding for 
Petrominerales’ oil assets.234 
 Unlike the preceding transactions, the Pacific Rubiales-
Petrominerales transaction was not litigated, and thus it is not clear 
how a court would address a similarly structured transaction in the 
future.  The next Subpart, however, does provide some guidance to 
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practitioners on the possible use of crown jewel lock-ups in a sale of a 
financially distressed company. 
B. Crown Jewel Lock-Ups and the Financially Distressed Company 
 A number of commentators have cited to the 2012 BGI-Shenzen 
(BGI)-Complete Genomics merger as yet another example of a 
modern crown jewel lock-up providing benefits to the target company 
separate and apart from the merger.235  As this Subpart details, however, 
the option in that transaction was not a crown jewel lock-up option, but 
rather a stock option.  This Article nevertheless contends that the BGI-
Complete Genomics transaction and the resulting Delaware 
jurisprudence stemming from this transaction set the foundation for 
using crown jewel lock-ups in transactions when the target is 
financially distressed.  Although BGI-Complete Genomics involved a 
stock option, the arguments advanced in support of the deal structure 
are transferable to crown jewel lock-ups. 
 The merger of Complete Genomics and BGI began on June 5, 
2012, when Complete Genomics retained Jefferies as its financial 
advisor to help it review strategic alternatives, including the possibility 
of a merger.236  Jefferies contacted forty-two parties, of which nine 
parties executed confidentiality agreements.237  The board then 
requested interested parties to submit nonbinding proposals.238  Of the 
nine parties who had executed confidentiality agreements, two 
submitted nonbinding proposals regarding a transaction and four 
indicated their interest in an equity investment.239  Negotiations 
“quickly focused on the two transactional proposals,” a period of 
negotiations with both parties ensued, and then one of the two parties 
requested exclusivity.240  On June 15, 2012, Jefferies instructed BGI 
that written, nonbinding, preliminary proposals for a transaction 
involving the sale of the company should be submitted by June 29, 
2012.241  BGI signed a confidentiality agreement on June 19, 2012, and 
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received a management presentation on Complete Genomics.242  On 
July 3, 2012, BGI submitted a written, nonbinding preliminary 
proposal to acquire Complete Genomics, and BGI was later informed 
that a final written proposal was due by July 31, 2012.243 
 During July 2012, BGI conducted research and due diligence on 
Complete Genomics, and it ultimately asked for additional time to 
submit its final written proposal, which was granted.244  On August 6, 
2012, BGI submitted a nonbinding proposal to acquire Complete 
Genomics.245  Complete Genomics’ management and financial and 
legal advisors reviewed the proposed agreement and provided BGI 
with a term sheet for bridge financing.246  On August 29, 2012, BGI 
provided a letter from a financial entity in China stating that the entity 
would finance the transaction for $3.15 a share; however, on August 
31, BGI provided another letter from the Export-Import Bank of 
China, stating that it would also finance the acquisition for $3.15 a 
share.247  BGI’s financial advisors decided that the Export-Import Bank 
of China would be a better lender for the proposed transaction.248  On 
September 15, 2012, the parties executed and delivered the all-cash 
merger agreement, representing a transaction value of nearly $117.6 
million, and issued a press release regarding the acquisition on 
September 17, 2012.249 
 On the same date the parties executed the merger agreement, 
Complete Genomics, BGI, and BGI-HONGKONG Co. (BGI-
HONGKONG), a wholly owned subsidiary of BGI, entered into a 
Convertible Subordinated Promissory Note (Note).250  Under the terms 
of the Note, BGI-HONGKONG, the lender, agreed to loan Complete 
Genomics, the borrower, up to an aggregate amount of $30 million to 
be used “solely for working capital and capital expenditure 
requirements in the ordinary course of business.”251 
 The Note was structured so that the “first draw” of $6 million 
would occur on October 1, 2012.252  Thereafter, beginning in November 
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2012, Complete Genomics could request funding of $6 million per 
month by giving written request to BGI-HONGKONG no fewer than 
three days prior to the “requested funding date.”253  The Note included 
certain conditions, including that “the Merger Agreement has not been 
terminated and remains a valid and binding obligation of the parties 
thereto.”254  The Note also gave Complete Genomics certain conversion 
and registration rights, pursuant to which BGI-HONGKONG had the 
right to convert the principal and interest due into common stock of 
Complete Genomics at the offer price.255  BGI-HONGKONG had the 
right to exercise this conversion right either upon termination of the 
Merger Agreement or upon a change of control of Complete 
Genomics.256  If BGI-HONGKONG were to exercise its conversion 
rights, it could own up to 22% of Complete Genomics’ stock.257 
 Shareholders brought suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery, 
seeking to enjoin the merger between Complete Genomics and BGI.258  
The shareholders argued that the Complete Genomics board had 
breached its fiduciary duties by implementing certain deal protection 
provisions into the merger agreement.259  Although Vice Chancellor 
Laster enjoined the “don’t ask, don’t waive” standstill provision in a 
potential bidder’s confidentiality agreement with Complete Genomics, 
he did not enjoin the merger between Complete Genomics and BGI.260  
Laster stated that the combination of the deal protection provisions and 
the bridge loan made the question of whether the merger agreement 
was preclusive a closer case.261  Ultimately, however, Laster was able to 
distinguish the bridge loan from the stock option in Paramount 
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. on the ground that the 
bridge loan provided a “substantial benefit” to Complete Genomics 
because of the company’s need for immediate cash.262  Laster 
recognized that the stock option in QVC “didn’t provide any benefit to 
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the target and only came into play in the event of a topping bid.”263  
Thus, Laster found that although the bridge loan (a crown jewel lock-
up) could be preclusive in other contexts, the fact that it provided a 
benefit to the target company in this particular transaction made it a 
nonpreclusive deal protection device.264  Accordingly, he refused to 
grant a preliminary injunction.265 
 Although, as earlier stated, the Complete Genomics option was a 
stock lock-up, not an asset lock-up, Laster’s reasoning potentially sets 
the groundwork for upholding asset lock-ups under similar 
circumstances.  Like the Supreme Court of New York in Bear Stearns, 
which emphasized the “financial catastrophe confronting Bear 
Stearns,”266 Laster focused on the “highly fragile state” of Complete 
Genomics in refusing to grant a preliminary injunction in In re 
Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation.267  Moreover, he 
emphasized that granting a preliminary injunction without a topping 
bid present would be imprudent because it could risk the current 
deal.268  Although it is clear that Complete Genomics’ economic state 
was far from healthy and it is completely possible a topping bid had 
not emerged due to Complete Genomics’ “fragile state,” it is equally 
possible that a topping bid had not emerged due to the deterrent effects 
of the lock-up.  Nonetheless, courts appear inclined to uphold lock-ups 
when an argument can be made that the target company is financially 
unwell.269  The parameters of how unwell a company must be for a 
court to uphold a lock-up have yet to be determined. 
IV. MODERN CROWN JEWEL LOCK-UPS:  A PASSING FAD, AN 
ENDURING CLASSIC, OR A FLEECING OF SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE? 
 The revival of crown jewel lock-ups in recent transactions renews 
the debate from the 1980s regarding the validity of lock-ups.  Unlike 
the courts in the 1980s, today’s courts have not yet enjoined the 
modern crown jewel lock-ups.270  Consequently, it remains to be seen 
whether the modern crown jewel lock-up is a passing fad or an 
enduring classic. 
                                                 
 263. Id. 
 264. See id. 
 265. See id. at 17. 
 266. In re Bear Stearns Litig., 870 N.Y.S.2d 709, 735 (Sup. Ct. 2008). 
 267. Complete Genomics, slip op. at 17. 
 268. See id. 
 269. See, e.g., id. 
 270. See, e.g., Bear Stearns, 870 N.Y.S.2d 709. 
 
 
 
 
580 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:545 
 
 Modern lock-ups appear to differ in some material respects from 
their predecessors.  The most significant difference is that, thus far, 
today’s lock-ups have only appeared in negotiated transactions, rather 
than in hostile transactions where they were typically combined with 
other defensive mechanisms such as poison pills and white knights.271  
The Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon even noted that economic 
conditions in the 1980s were such that enticing a white knight to enter 
a bidding war required “some form of compensation to cover the risks 
and costs involved.”272  Although hostile transactions are on the rise, 
amicable transactions remain the hallmark of today’s economic 
environment.273  As a result, modern lock-ups have morphed in the 
more harmonious environment in which they are being used. 
 Another significant difference is that the 1980s case law has 
influenced dealmakers and their practices.274  Dealmakers have been 
careful to document the decision process leading up to the lock-up.275  
In doing so, dealmakers have taken almost painstaking steps to 
differentiate today’s lock-ups from the lock-ups of the 1980s and have 
attempted to make clear that the lock-ups could be stand-alone 
transactions or have business purposes separate and apart from the 
merger transactions themselves.276 
 Dealmakers’ preoccupation with issues such as whether the lock-
up can be attributed to another business purpose or can be a stand-
alone transaction from the merger is misplaced.  Although at first 
glance these modern lock-ups can appear benign and different from 
their 1980s predecessors, today’s lock-ups do not differ greatly from 
their predecessors.  The saying “everything old becomes new again” 
holds true for today’s lock-ups.  Although today’s lock-ups have 
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evolved into more sophisticated transactions as a result of historical 
precedents, economic development, and outside socio-political 
influences, at the heart of the matter, modern lock-ups are the same as 
their 1980s predecessors. 
A. The Family Jewels 
 The lock-ups of the 1980s concerned some of the most 
significant and valuable assets of the target company, typically 
divisions of the target.  For example, the Revlon lock-up was for the 
company’s Vision Care and National Health Laboratories divisions.277  
Similarly, the Macmillan lock-up involved eight Macmillan 
subsidiaries,278 while the Hanson lock-up pertained to SCM’s Pigments 
and Consumer Foods businesses.279  Likewise, the Cottle lock-up gave 
KKR the right to purchase either Storer’s cable stations or its television 
stations,280 and the Holly Farms lock-up provided ConAgra the right to 
purchase Holly Farms’ “prime poultry operations.”281 
 Like their predecessors, modern lock-ups still concern some of 
the most significant and valuable assets of the target company.  Unlike 
their predecessors, however, today’s lock-ups generally do not involve 
subsidiaries or divisions, but rather technology or other rights.  For 
example, AuthenTec granted Apple the right to acquire “non-exclusive, 
perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide license[s]” in AuthenTec hardware 
and software technology and sensor patents.282  The technology and 
patents went to the heart of AuthenTec’s business, which developed 
and provided “mobile security software licenses and fingerprint sensor 
technology.”283  Although these licenses were nonexclusive, the effect 
of the licenses was exclusivity because Apple no longer had to buy or 
license AuthenTec technology.  Once Apple made the payments as 
required under the IP Agreement, Apple no longer owed any 
consideration; the agreement did not provide ongoing income to 
AuthenTec.  In addition, although the licenses were nonexclusive, there 
were likely no other companies interested in licensing the technology.  
This much was evident from AuthenTec’s initial search for a company 
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with which to partner to develop the technology.  Thus, the money 
AuthenTec could make from the technology was likely to come from 
Apple.  But AuthenTec essentially sold the technology to Apple, which 
meant that in the long run, AuthenTec would not enjoy that stream of 
income.  Accordingly, when evaluating AuthenTec as a takeover target, 
AuthenTec’s value would be greatly diminished.284 
 I must note, however, that this is not to say that every merger-
agreement-related intellectual property agreement should be classified 
as a crown jewel lock-up.  Instead, the business effects of the 
agreement must be evaluated, as well as the relationship between the 
agreement and any merger agreements.  The unique aspects of each 
business and transaction must be considered, as well as the preceding 
sale process (if the company is in Revlon-mode) and the deterrent 
effects of the intellectual property agreement on other potential 
bidders. 
 Similarly to the Apple-AuthenTec deal, Petrominerales granted 
Pacific Rubiales an option to purchase Petrominerales’ equity and 
transportation rights in certain pipelines located in Colombia.285  This 
option was particularly valuable because the pipeline was the most 
efficient manner in which to transport oil in Colombia, a country 
whose transportation infrastructure is lacking.286  Pacific Rubiales 
announced that these equity and transportation rights would help it to 
cut costs on transportation of some of its crude oil.287  Like the options 
of old, this option worked to deter “competing buyer[s] from cherry-
picking Petrominerales’ oilfield assets.”288  But unlike the options of 
old, if a competing bid emerged for these assets, Petrominerales was 
not bound to sell the assets to Pacific Rubiales.289  Despite this unique 
out, the option still had the potential to deter bidders because bidders 
who were only willing to buy all of the Petrominerales assets subject to 
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the lock-up would likely not be as attractive as Pacific Rubiales, who 
was bound to buy all the assets.  Moreover, in order to be competitive, 
bidders would have to offer at least a little bit more than the 
Petrominerales offer for all of the Midstream Assets. 
 The NYSE-ICE transaction is the most unlike the traditional 
crown jewel lock-up.  Instead of acquiring an asset of the target 
company (here, NYSE), the acquirer (here, ICE) provided services to 
the target in exchange for a fixed fee plus a margin of the services.290  
This agreement remained in place even if the proposed merger were to 
fall through.291  When considering the ramifications of this agreement, 
it becomes clear that although the form may be different, the 
substantive result is that the Clearing Services Agreement was a crown 
jewel lock-up.  A third party considering whether to jump the NYSE-
ICE transaction would be forced to consider that, unless it had its own 
clearing services, it most likely would be doing business with (indeed, 
obtaining an essential service from) the party whose very deal it just 
disrupted.  Then-Chancellor Strine was of the opinion that this was not 
a crown jewel lock-up because a third party could buy ICE out of its 
contract or “frankly, you just make clear to them [that] they better be a 
great clearinghouse.”292  From a practical perspective, this seems easier 
said than done.  If ICE were not a “great clearinghouse,” what would 
the third party do then? The third party would be forced to take on 
additional costs in creating its own clearing services or possibly find 
another party to provide those clearing services.  Then-Chancellor 
Strine himself recognized that the Clearing Services Agreement was 
crucial to NYSE because of the various approvals that would be 
needed.293  Accordingly, to find that the Clearing Services Agreement 
was not a crown jewel lock-up is a misstatement. 
 Instead, this Article contends that what then-Chancellor Strine 
intended to hold was that the NYSE-ICE lock-up—while a lock-up—
was not preclusive because, as a practical matter, there were not any 
viable merger partners to preclude from making a bid.  NYSE had 
already executed a deal with Deutsche Börse AG that fell through after 
the European Commission had prohibited the transaction over 
anticompetitive concerns.294  Other than ICE, it seems the one other 
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viable strategic potential merger partner would have been NASDAQ.  
NYSE had already rejected a joint offer from ICE and NASDAQ, 
citing regulatory concerns.295  Apart from the fact that NYSE and 
NASDAQ are direct competitors, the idea that NYSE and NASDAQ 
could successfully engage in a transaction without raising any 
regulatory concerns was, as then-Chancellor Strine summed up, 
“funny.”296 
 As these cases show, dealmakers and the courts alike seem to shy 
away from declaring that certain assets are crown jewels.297  This 
avoidance likely stems from the 1980s jurisprudence questioning the 
validity of lock-ups involving crown jewels.  It is easier to say that 
something is not a crown jewel asset than to wrestle with the close 
scrutiny applicable to crown jewel lock-ups.  In concentrating on 
whether an asset is a crown jewel, dealmakers seemed to have lost 
sight of the fact that the 1980s jurisprudence focused on the auction 
process preceding entry into the lock-up and the role the lock-up 
played within that process. 
B. The Bidding Process:  A Fleecing of Shareholder Value? 
 Under the 1980s jurisprudence, the preceding sale process and 
the target board’s actions are outcome determinative in evaluating 
whether a crown jewel lock-up will be upheld.  In Revlon, the 
Delaware Supreme Court made clear that lock-ups would be valid 
where “their adoption is untainted by director interest or other breaches 
of fiduciary duty.”298  Similarly, the Second Circuit in Cottle explained 
that the relevant inquiry should be whether there was a fair auction and 
whether the bidder being afforded the lock-up made the best offer, not 
whether the lock-up effectively ended the bidding process.299  The 
courts in the 1980s were concerned with whether a target was using a 
lock-up to favor one bidder over another in a manner that minimized, 
not maximized, shareholder value.300  If a target used a lock-up to favor 
one bidder over another, there was a potential that the target was 
leaving money on the table that should instead be in the shareholders’ 
pockets.  Accordingly, the courts in the 1980s focused on whether the 
                                                 
 295. Id. 
 296. NYSE Euronext, slip op. at 11. 
 297. See, e.g., id. at 13. 
 298. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 (Del. 
1986). 
 299. See Cottle v. Storer Commc’n, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 576 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 300. For a description of the courts’ treatment of crown jewel lock-ups, see supra Part 
II.A. 
 
 
 
 
2016] FLEECING THE FAMILY JEWELS 585 
 
target was using a lock-up in a manner that shut down the bidding 
process.301  Along these lines, the courts repeatedly stated in dicta that 
if the target was using the lock-up to draw bidders into the bidding 
process and to enhance shareholder value, the courts would be more 
inclined to uphold those lock-ups.302  Commentators have recognized 
the importance of the sale process, stating that crown jewel lock-ups 
“should normally be preceded by an auction or market canvass and 
would need to withstand close scrutiny.”303 
 Upon first glance, it would appear that target boards and their 
attorneys have taken these lessons to heart and have conducted sale 
processes intended to maximize stockholder value.  But things are not 
always as they seem, and upon a closer examination, the transactions 
leading up to today’s lock-ups fall short of the sale processes 
envisioned by the courts in the 1980s.  The Apple-AuthenTec 
transaction provides the best example of things not always being what 
they seem to be.  At the outset, AuthenTec contacted “several leading 
consumer electronics companies” to gauge their interest in 
AuthenTec’s new technology.304  Of the companies contacted, only 
Apple expressed an interest in the technology and moved forward with 
negotiating a commercial contract.305  The tides soon changed, however, 
and Apple used the commercial contract negotiations and its 
bargaining power to essentially force AuthenTec into merger 
negotiations without allowing AuthenTec to otherwise test the 
market.306  AuthenTec was forced into a corner—either proceed in a 
lucrative deal with Apple on Apple’s terms or contact other potential 
buyers and risk losing out on any and all potential transactions with 
Apple. 
 Counsel for AuthenTec argued that the fact the lock-up arose out 
of commercial agreement negotiations that “morphed into a merger 
agreement cuts directly against the notion” that the lock-up was 
“designed to preclude bidding, designed to preclude somebody 
jumping the merger.”307  Counsel argued that the manner in which the 
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lock-up arose was “exactly the reverse of how lock-ups occur.”308  In 
making that argument, however, AuthenTec’s counsel failed to 
recognize that AuthenTec never engaged in an auction or a market 
canvass for the entire company, or at least not to the standard 
envisioned by the courts in the 1980s.  Approaching customers to sell 
software or to otherwise coordinate to develop software is simply not 
the same as approaching those customers to sell an entire company.  
As such, AuthenTec did not engage in any market check and then 
found itself cornered by Apple. 
 Of the modern crown jewel lock-up transactions discussed in this 
Article, the Pacific Rubiales-Petrominerales transaction is the only one 
that was preceded by a market check approaching the type envisioned 
by the courts in the 1980s.  In the months leading up to its transaction 
with Pacific Rubiales, Petrominerales hired a financial advisor to 
advise it on potential acquisition partners.309  Moreover, seven parties 
executed confidentiality agreements and proceeded with due diligence, 
which resulted in one party’s making an offer.310  Petrominerales 
continued discussions with the parties who entered into confidentiality 
agreements up to September 2013, the same month that it entered into 
an agreement with Pacific Rubiales.311  Although Pacific Rubiales was 
not one of the seven parties who initially entered into confidentiality 
agreements and was not the one party who made an offer early in the 
process, through this market canvass, the Petrominerales board should 
have been able to effectively assess Petrominerales’ value and to 
evaluate potential merger partners’ interests in the company.  If the 
courts in the 1980s had been reviewing this transaction, they most 
likely would have upheld the lock-up and would have urged future 
dealmakers to engage in a similar type of sale process before agreeing 
to a lock-up.312 
C. Can Lock-ups Become an Enduring Classic? 
 Despite some alterations, modern crown jewel lock-ups are not 
materially different from their 1980s predecessors.  A limited number 
of recent deals have included lock-ups, and it remains to be seen 
whether more dealmakers will follow this trend and incorporate these 
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devices into their future transactions or whether they will continue to 
be deterred by the 1980s jurisprudence. 
 Although limited modern case law addresses crown jewel lock-
ups and is mainly in the form of dicta, today’s courts appear willing to 
uphold lock-ups, particularly if the assets of a financially distressed 
company are at stake or if the court is of the opinion that limited 
serious merger partners exist.313  In potentially upholding a lock-up 
based on one of these reasons, however, courts should be cautious that 
dealmakers are not using these “reasons” as a means of concealing a 
fleecing of the target’s assets and, consequently, shareholder value.  As 
Vice Chancellor Parsons alluded to in the Apple-AuthenTec litigation, 
courts should scrutinize the underlying business transaction and the 
sale process preceding entry into the lock-up.314 
 This is not to say that dealmakers should eschew crown jewel 
lock-ups.  To the contrary, dealmakers should not be as quick to shy 
away from lock-ups as they have been in the past.  In agreeing to lock-
ups, however, targets must be sure that an active auction process or an 
extensive market canvass has taken place (at least a process similar to 
that which occurred in the Pacific Rubiales-Petrominerales 
transaction).  Moreover, targets may even inform bidders that the target 
would be willing to agree to a crown jewel lock-up following an 
extensive sale process.  As a result, and consistent with arguments I 
have made in previous articles addressing deal protection devices, 
bidders may be enticed to submit even higher bids for the target 
company.315  To avoid the possibility that the target may be left at the 
altar without its most valuable family jewels, target boards also must 
ensure that the option to purchase is only triggered when the target has 
terminated the agreement to enter into a definitive agreement with 
another bidder.  Admittedly, this will deter potential third-party 
overbids, but because the target will have already engaged in an 
extensive sale process, pursuant to which any potential bidders will 
have already had the opportunity to pursue a transaction, the likelihood 
that the target or its shareholders will be harmed is minimal.  
Undeniably, this entails a weighing of the extensiveness of the sales 
process and the likelihood that no additional value has been left on the 
table against the deterrent nature of the lock-up itself.  Engaging in an 
                                                 
 313. See supra text accompanying notes 206-207. 
 314. See supra text accompanying notes 206-207. 
 315. See, e.g., Sautter, supra note 260, at 567-69 (setting forth a framework allowing 
for “don’t ask, don’t waive” standstills to be used that is based on the target engaging in an 
extensive presigning sales process). 
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extensive sale process in which all bidders are told that the target is 
willing to, and is likely to, agree to a lock-up at the end of the process 
should result in achieving the highest possible value for stockholders.316  
Engaging in an extensive sale process and permitting lock-ups only 
under these limited circumstances will ensure that the target’s family 
jewels are not being fleeced and that crown jewel lock-ups could 
become an enduring classic. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 As the saying goes, “everything old becomes new again.”  Crown 
jewel lock-ups are no different.  Once a popular deal protection device 
in the 1980s, crown jewel lock-ups have reemerged in some recent 
deals.  This time around, dealmakers have attempted to distinguish 
these lock-ups from their predecessors.  Dealmakers have taken almost 
painstaking steps to differentiate today’s lock-ups from earlier lock-ups 
and have attempted to make clear that the lock-up could be a stand-
alone transaction or has a business purpose separate and apart from the 
merger transaction itself.  This Article argues, however, that today’s 
lock-ups are not significantly different from their predecessors.  
Practitioners and courts should not lose sight of the 1980s 
jurisprudence that closely scrutinized the sale process preceding the 
lock-up as well as the deterrent effects of the lock-up on potential 
bidders.  Failing to consider these factors and not giving these factors 
proper weight potentially results in companies and their shareholders 
being fleeced of their corporate family jewels and their value. 
                                                 
 316. Professor Franklin A. Gevurtz has argued that “if the lock-up is large enough to 
chase away any higher bidders and pressure shareholders into voting for the transaction 
simply to avoid triggering the lock-up, then the lock-up gains nothing of value by buying time 
for the shareholders.”  Franklin A. Gevurtz, Removing Revlon, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485, 
1508 (2013).  Although this argument may be true, if the target has engaged in the type of 
sale process this Article envisions and makes it clear to all potential bidders that there may be 
certainty in the form of a crown jewel lock-up at the end of the process, there should not be a 
situation where a higher bidder is deterred; that higher bidder will have already submitted its 
bid on the front end.  Of course, this argument presupposes that the sale process was quite 
extensive in nature (i.e., that virtually every possible buyer was contacted) and that all bidders 
were operating with the same information and rules.  Hence, the courts would be scrutinizing 
the sale process and whether the target board and its advisors ran the sale process in good 
faith. 
